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L.F.E. GOLDIE*

State Responsibility and the
Expropriation of Property
I. A Problem of Meaning
A. State Responsibility "Stricto Sensu"
There is a major difference between the traditional Anglo-American concept
of State responsibility and that advocated by many continental European
publicists which has not been adequately perceived as an important, indeed
fundamental, line of cleavage in international legal doctrine. It is a cleavage,
moreover, which has the potential for important political and economic consequences. These, too, at present, have not been clearly perceived. Traditionally,
Anglo-American writers, with some exceptions,' have tended to accept, rather
without question, the notion that the term State responsibility deals with, in
the main, the obligations of a host state to the person and property of
aliens-this theory has been denominated "government liability"' by the second or "continental" perspective of the subject. Be that as it may, this theory,
which has been designated "State responsibility stricto sensu " by the International Law Commission, 3 provided the theme of Professor F.V. Garcia
Amador's earlier reports and memorandum for the International Law Com*Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University College
of Law, on leave 1976-78, Senior Legal Officer, United Nations Secretariat. The views expressed

in this study are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United
Nations Secretariat.
'See, the text accompanying footnote 23 infra.
'For some examples of the Anglo-American perspective, see, AMERASINGHE, C.F., STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967); DAWSON, F.G., HEAD,
I.L., and HERZOG, P.E., INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS
(Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse U. Press, 1971); DUNN, FREDERICK S., THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1932); EAGLETON, CLYDE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (New York City, New York U. Press, 1928); BAXTER, R.R.,
GARCIA-AMADOR, F.V. AND SOHN, L.B., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIESTO ALIENS (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1974); FREEMAN, ALWYN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE (London, Longmans Green, 1938);
Root, E., The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 4 at 20 (1910).
'Following Mr. Tsuroaka's "Working Document" for the International Law Commission.
See [1963] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission at 247, U.N. Pub.
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mission (of which there were some six reports and one memorandum)."
This concept has, however, not been permitted to go unchallenged. For
there is a second theory of State responsibility which is based on the civil law
theory that a breach of an obligation (any obligation in municipal or international law) gives rise to responsibility. This second theory has been designated
"State responsibility lato sensu"I by the International Law Commission. We
may, furthermore, identify the publicists who have adopted this approach as
the "Continental School" (in contrast with the "Anglo-American School") in
spite of the twin facts that not all continental European legal philosophers embrace its perspectives and that its tenets are propounded far beyond the confines of continental Europe and, indeed, wherever civil law theories of liability
are dominant.
The challenge to the Anglo-American perception of State responsibility
(i.e., "State responsibility stricto sensu") has been particularly strong in the
Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and in the International Law Commission. For example, Professor Garcia Amador's reports
drew the following comment from Professor Ago as the International Law
Commission's later Special Rapporteur on the subject:
Criticisms were also made of methods. These criticisms were essentially that the attempt at codification, which should have been devoted to the entire topic of respon-

A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.l, Sales No. 63 V.2 (1965).
'These were:
DOCUMENT
TITLE
A/CN.4/80 Memorandum presentadopor
F. V. Garcia A mador

REFERENCE

Yearbook of
the InternationalLaw
Commission, 1954,
Vol. I1, p. 21;
Ibid., 1956, Vol. 11,
p. 173;

State responsibility: International responsibility:
report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
Special Rapporteur,
A/CN.4/106 State responsibility: International responsibility:
Ibid., 1957, Vol. I1,
second report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
p. 104;
Special Rapporteur,
A/CN.4/I Il State responsibility: International responsibility:
Ibid., 1958, Vol. Ii,
third report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
p. 47;
Special Rapporteur,
Ibid., 1959, Vol. I1,
A/CN.4/119 State responsibility: International responsibility:
fourth report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
p. 1;
Special Rapporteur;
A/CN.4/125 State responsibility: International responsibility:
Ibid., 1960, Vol. il,
fifth report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
p. 41;
Special Rapporteur;
A/CN.4/134 State responsibility: International responsibility: Ibid., 1961, Vol. 11,
and Add.I
sixth report by F.V. Garcia Amador,
p. I.
Special Rapporteur;
'See, Tsuroaka, "Working Document," (1963) 2 Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission 247, U.N. Pub. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/Add.I, Sales No. 63 V.2.
A/CN.4/96
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sibility, now appeared to be limited to the sole field of responsibility for injuries
caused to individual aliens. The Special Rapporteur was thus reproached for having
disregarded other aspects of the question which were of much greater importance,
especially from the standpoint of consequences. 6
From the time of this criticism onward, the International Law Commission
has rejected the Anglo-American approach and embraced the more philosophical and generalized view of State responsibility lato sensu, thereby relegating
the legal rules which have denominated in the International Law Commission,
as State responsibility stricto sensu7 to a role of little, if any, relevance to the
broader sweep which the alternative thesis is perceived to reflect.
B. State Responsibility "Lato Sensu"
A number of very influential continental European writers, stressing the element of sanctions in an extended sense which includes reparations and
damages,' see the term responsibility as indicating an essential element of the
nature and form of legal rules. It sees a legal rule as completed only when the
"secondary norms" of effectiveness (or sanctions) are added to the "primary
norms" of obligation. Reflecting this latter legal philosophical position Professor AIf Ross has written:
The division that is made may be described approximately as follows: In one part is
ruled what one may and may not do; in a second part the legal sanctions are stated
that result if one acts contrary to those rules; and in a third part the procedure is
prescribed in which the courts shall impose sanctions. In the pages to come the division will be described more accurately. The division is not carried out consistently in
all fields of law, but can vary with the particular characteristics of the material or
chance traditions. By and large this is the scheme that is followed:
(1) In one part, known as substantive or primary law, a certain objective conduct is
described as the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a sanction. This condition is usually stated indirectly by characterising a certain conduct as a duty-which
implies that the opposite conduct is the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
sanction.
A rule of substantive law is only a fragment of a rule of conduct. So far we do not
know what other conditions are required for judgment nor the nature of the sanction
that can be applied against a person who behaves contrary to the substantive law. But
the presentation of the substantive law is important nevertheless. Even if we do not
know what will happen in the case of its breach, we do know that a person who does
not break these rules is safe: his conduct will not give rise to sanctions.
(2) In a second part, which we may call the law of sanctions, or secondary law, are
stated (a) the various sanctions which can be applied against a person who has broken
the substantive law, and (b) the more precise conditions-outside the objective

6
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 Add.1, (1969) 2 Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, p.
125, 134 (U.N. Pub. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/Add.1, Sales No. E.70 V.8, 1970).

'See, supra, note 3 and the accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Ago, Roberto, Le Delit International,Academie de Droit International, RECUEIL DES
p. 415 (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1939); Ross, ALF, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

COURS, Vol. 68,

LAW 241 (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1947).
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course of conduct-under which the various sanctions can be applied. The law of
torts thus in the main presumes primary rules concerning duties and corresponding
wrongs (determined among other things by the rules governing the distribution of
property) and on this basis determines the further conditions for liability (negligence,
sanity of mind, and so on); and the further rules establishing which consequences of a
wrongful act fall within the liability, and so on.
To sum up: A distinction between substantive law and the law of sanctions is not
consistently observed (which, incidentally, would actually scarcely be desirable). This
explains why customarily a distinction is frequently made between substantive law
and the law of sanctions-the law of torts and criminal law being included under
substantive law.
(3) In a third part, finally, known as procedural or tertiary law, are treated the further conditions-apart from circumstances surrounding the liable person-which
must be fulfilled so that judgment can be rendered and enforced. These conditions
concern the procedure that must be followed to establish liability and enforce it, including particularly the rules governing the bringing of an action, proof, and the
handling of the case before the courts. 9
The foregoing quotation represents a dominant school of writers who have
accepted the thesis that responsibility is a formal concept of law designating
the mandatory or compulsive component of a legal norm and thus a necessary
element for completing such norms of conduct in a legal system. It represents a
positivistic philosophical position applicable to all legal systems. In this vein
Anzilotti wrote: "L'existence d'un ordre juridique international postule que
les sujets auxquels sont imposes des devoirs 6galement r~pondre de l'inaccomplissement de ces devoirs." 0
Although the pursuit of a positivistic definition of law employing sanctions
as an essential element may be said to have begun with the English jurist John
Austin, Anglo-American legal philosophers, even of the positivistic
("analytical") school, have, in this century, increasingly relegated sanctions to
a subordinate place in their perceptions of the meaning of law. For example,
such a writer in the mainstream of contemporary English analytical
jurisprudence as Professor H. L. A. Hart perceives sanctions and enforcement
as a necessary social fact rather than as a logically necessary component of
every legal norm.'' Thus, he rejects the idea of sanctions altogether from those
rules which he sees as "facultative" or "facilitating." He writes:
There is some analogy (notwithstanding many important differences) between such
general orders and the law of torts, the primary aim of which is to provide individuals
with compensation for harm suffered as the result of the conduct of others. Here too
the rules which determine what types of conduct constitute actionable wrongs are
spoken of as imposing on persons, irrespective of their wishes, "duties" (or more
9

Ross,
1959).
0

ALF,ON LAW AND JUSTICE

209-210 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, U. of California Press,

' ANZILOTTI, DIoNISIO, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Vol. I at 467 (Gidel, Gilbert, transl.,

Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1929).
'See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27, 33-35, 36-38, 39, 48, 95, 193-95, 211-15,
235-36, 244, 255-56.
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rarely "obligations") to abstain from such conduct. This conduct is itself termed a
"breach of duty" and the compensation or other legal remedies a "sanction." But
there are important classes of law where this analogy with orders backed by threats
altogether fails, since they perform a quite different social function. Legal rules
defining the ways in which valid contracts or wills or marriages are made do not require persons to act in certain ways whether they wish to or not. Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain specified
procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures of rights and duties within
the coercive framework of the law.I 2
Hart (representing an important Anglo-American philosophical movement)
does of course, utilize the term "secondary rules." But these are very different
from the "secondary norms" to be found in the writings of Ross and other
European positivists. For him they are "rules of recognition," which,
performing a function in his system rather similar to Kelsen's Grundnorm in
his, are the means of identifying the primary rules of obligation. He writes:
The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the rdgime of primary rules is
the introduction of what we shall call a "rule of recognition." This will specify some
feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social
pressure it exerts. The existence of such a rule of recognition may take any of a huge
variety of forms, simple or complex. It may, as in the early law of many societies, be
no more than that an authoritative list or text of the rules is to be found in a written
document or carved on some public monument.
In a developed legal system the rules of recognition are of course more complex; instead of identifying rules exclusively by reference to a text or list they do so by
reference to some general characteristic possessed by the primary rules. This may be
the fact of their having been enacted by a specific body, or their long customary practice, or their relation to judicial decisions."
Whatever its merit, the type of analysis exemplified in the quotation from
Ross at the outset of this section remains influential outside the AngloAmerican common law world and especially so in both Western and Eastern
Europe. For the writers who embrace this second theory, responsibility
becomes coextensive with the legal system itself and is not limited to one
category of wrongful conduct. Its adherents perceive responsibility arising
whenever there is a breach of an obligation. Applying this perception to international law, State responsibility is then perceived as coming into play
whenever a State has committed a wrong against another State, be the consequential sanctions reparatory or punitive in nature.
The Continental School's sweeping perspective also applies to the justifications and excuses which, constituting "circumstances excluding [state] respon-

'Ibid. at 27.
'Ibid., at 92.
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sibility," in point of fact provide defences for all forms of international
wrongdoing falling within their scope. For example, an act motivated by the
extreme necessity of a situation which may cause a lesser harm to a neighbouring state than the emergency may inflict upon the actor or upon a third party
may be viewed, at one and the same time, both as privileged (the primary
norm) and as defensible (the secondary norm) against a claim of wrongdoing
by virtue of that extreme necessity.
Since, in the International Law Commission, State responsibility has
become the name of the set of secondary norms which render the primary or
substantive norms effective, it is necessary that the category of formal secondary norms should also recognize that conduct may be justified, or it may be
excused. In this vein the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission has listed the following special circumstances as possibly capable of
abrogating the normal illegitimacy of an act, in addition to the state of
emergency (necessity): (1) "the legitimate application of a sanction as precluding wrongfulness;"' (2) consent of the injured state; (3) self-defence; and (4)
force majeure and fortuitous event" (inevitable accident)." Professor Ross
has, in addition, identified a sixth circumstance excluding responsibility,
namely, the "legitimacy of otherwise prohibited acts by their usefulness."' 6
1I.State Responsibility "Lato Sensu" and Public
International Law-The Publicists
An example of a publicist who has accepted the reception of the continental
(or lato sensu) perspective of State responsibility into public international law
is provided by Professor Gregory Tunkin, one of the Soviet Union's leading
writers in public international law, who tells us:
Under the influence of civilist concepts in the science of international law, the view
was widespread that state responsibility amounted to the duty to compensate damage
caused. According to this concept, the failure of a state to fulfill its obligations under
international law entailed a new obligation: the obligation to compensate damage
(financial and moral) caused to another state."

"See Ago, Roberto, Le Delit International(1939-Il) Academie de Droit International,

RECUEIL

vol. 68, p. 415, at 532-545 (Paris, Sirey, 1939). Ross, ALF, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1947).
'This "circumstance" is perceived as distinct from "state of emergency" ("ktat d6 necessit6").
See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session, OFDES COURS,

FICIAL

RECORDS

OF

THE

GENERAL

ASSEMBLY,

THIRTIETH

SESSION,

Supplement No. 10

(A/10010/Rev.1), p.8 See also Ross, supra note 14 at 250.
,6ibid "

1'TUNKIN, GREGORY, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (transl. Butler, W., Cambridge,
Mass.,Harvard U.P. 1974) (footnotes omitted). For statements by Professor Ago adopting a
similar thesis, see, supra, notes 27 and 28.
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The historic changes that have taken place in international law since the Great October Socialist Revolution have necessarily also affected that branch of international
law relating to state responsibility. We must dwell on these changes, for they still are
far from adequately treated and worked out in international legal doctrine.
The sanction as an "indication of those measures of state coercion which are applied to those violating a prohibition or those failing to execute the command of a
norm of law" is inherent in norms of international law as legal norms. Of course, in
international law both the sanctions themselves and their realization have many
peculiarities in comparison with sanctions in national law.
Responsibility in international law, in any event responsibility in a broad sense, embraces both the problem of sanctions and the question of their realization. That is to
say, international legal responsibility is the legal consequence of violating norms of
international law.'
The legal consequences of violating norms of international law take many forms
and may affect not only the offending state, but also the injured state, other states,
and international organizations. Such consequences may, for example, depending
upon the character of the breach, include the duty of the offending state to compensate for the damage caused; the right of the injured state to apply enforcement
measures permitted by international law against the offending state; the right of
other states to render assistance to the injured state; and perhaps the duty of an international organization to undertake certain actions against the offending state. 9
Since treaty and customary norms have identical binding force, state responsibility
arises in the event of a violation of either customary or treaty norms of international
law. What difference can there be in the question of responsibility when in one case a
state has violated a particular customary principle or customary norm of international law, and in another case, a principle or norm fixed in an international treaty?
Take, for example, the case of a violation of the principle of freedom of the high
seas. As long as the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas had not entered into
force, this principle was a generally recognized customary principle of international
law; after the Geneva Convention had entered into force, this principle, in the form
in which it was fixed in this Convention, became a treaty norm for its parties. Of
course, there are no grounds for believing that responsibility for a violation of this
principle changed once it had become a treaty [norm] for the respective states. A
violation of either a customary or a treaty norm of international law is an international delict.
These legal consequences which ensue for a state as a result of its violation of international law are the content of international legal responsibility.2"
As the Reports2 ' of Professor Ago, the Special Rapporteur of the Interna-

"Ibid., at 381.
'Ibid., at 382 (footnotes omitted).
2
Ibid., at 383 (footnotes omitted).
2

IDOCUMENT

TITLE

A/CN.4/217 First Report on State Responsibility, by
and Add.l,
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur,
A/CN.4/233, Second Report on State Responsibility by
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur,
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REFERENCE

Yearbook of the Int'l
Law Commission,
1969, Vol. II, p. 125;
Ibid., 1970 Vol. I1
p. 177;
Continued on next page
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tional Law Commission on State Responsibility, amply illustrate, the lato sensu approach has become generally received and approved in that body. This
perspective has also received the continuing approval of the General Assembly
of the United Nations.22
Among the English-speaking writers, on the other hand, Professor Schwartzenberger is one of the relatively unusual publicists who have defined the scope
and characteristics of State responsibility in terms of the lato sensu perspective. This is reflected clearly in his statement:
The rules underlying the principle of international responsibility are the complement
of all other rules of international law. They transform otherwise admonitory precepts
into legal norms and, in this sense, may also be described-albeit with little gain- 6-as
sanctions of international law. It is the function of these rules to determine the legal
consequences of the breach of any of the other rules of international law, be they

DOCUMENT

A/CN.4/217
and Add.2,
A/CN.4/246
and Add.l-3,
A/CN.4/264
and Add. 1,
A/9010/
Rev. 1,
A/9610/
Rev. 1,
A/10010/
Rev. 1,
A/31/10,

A/31/10,

TITLE

REFERENCE

First Report on State Responsibility by
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur-Addendum,
Third Report on State Responsibility by
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur,
Fourth Report on State Responsibility by
Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur,
Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Twenty-fifth Session,
7 May - 13 July 1973, Chapter II,
Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Twenty-sixth Session,
6 May - 26 July 1974, Chapter 11,
Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Twenty-seventh Session,
5 May - 25 July 1975, Chapter II,
Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Twenty-eighth Session,
3 May - 23 July 1976, Chapter III,
Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Twenty-ninth Session,
9 May - 29 July 1977, Chapter II,

Ibid., 1971, Vol.
p. 193;
Ibid., 1971, Vol.
p. 199;
Ibid., 1972, Vol.
p. 71;
Ibid., 1973, Vol.
p. 161 at 165;

II,
I1,
II,
11,

Ibid., 1974, Vol. II;

Ibid., 1975, Vol. 11,
p. 47, at 51;
Ibid., 1976, Vol. 11,
part two, p. 1, at 69;

United Nations General
Assembly Official
Records, 32nd Session,
Supplement No. 10, at 5.
22(1) Resolution 2400 (XXIII), Para. 4(c), United Nations General Assembly Official Records,
23rd Sess. Supp. No. 18, at 87, U.N. Doc A/7218 (1969); (2) Resolution 2501 (XXIV), Para. 4(c),
United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 24th Sess. Supp. No. 30, at 97, 98, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1970); (3) Resolution 2634 (XXV), Para. 4 (c), United Nations General Assembly Official
Records, 25th Sess. Supp. No. 28, at 124-25, U.N. Doc. 8028 (1971); (4) Resolution 2780 (XXVI),
Para. 4(b), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 26th Sess. Supp. No. 29, at 136,
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972); (5) Resolution 2926 (XXVII), Para. 3(a), United Nations General
Assembly Official Records, 27th Sess. Supp. No. 30, at 113-114, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973); (6)
Resolution 3071 (XXVIII), Para. 3(b), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 28th
Sess. Supp. No. 30, at 140, 141, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); (7) Resolution 3315 (XXIX), Para.
4(a), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 29th Sess. Supp. No. 31, at 144, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1975); (8) Resolution 3495 (XXX), Para. 4(b), United Nations General Assembly
Official Records, 30th Sess. Supp. No. 34, at 150, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976); (9) Resolution
31/97, Para. 4(b), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 31st Sess. Supp. No. 39, at
181, 182, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (c 1977). See also, infra, footnote 39 and the accompanying text.
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those of treaties, international customary law or general principles of law recognised
by civilised nations."
III. Some Differences of Approach within the
"Continental School"
Starting with the common Grotian premise that in the law of nations, as
with domestic law, maleficium provides an independent source of legal obligation," theorists have differed on the definition of the legal relations created by
an internationally wrongful act. The classical view has long been that these
relations have but one single form. It is that of a bilateral relationship whereby

the wrongdoing State is obliged to make reparation-in the widest sense-and
the injured State has a reciprocal subjective right to require it. The second
thesis, for example as represented by Kelsen,25 while upholding the idea of the
single legal relationship flowing from the wrongful act, asserts that obligation
to make reparation is merely a subsidiary duty placed between the wrongful
act and the application of measures of coercion in domestic law or the agreement settling the dispute in international law. Kelsen added, moreover, that:
However, such agreement might not be reached. Even if it has been reached, it
does not suffice to establish the concrete obligation to make reparation. The state
responsible for a delict is not obliged to comply with any unilateral demand for
reparation made by the injured state. They must also come to an agreement concerning the content of the reparation to be made. As long as these agreements concerning
the existence of the delict and the content of the reparation are not concluded, it is
hardly possible to assume the existence of a concrete obligation to make reparation.
Under national law, the situation is substantially different. No such agreements are
necessary, for there are courts competent to ascertain the existence of the delict and
to determine the content of the reparation to be made in case the parties concerned
cannot reach agreement in these respects.26
Professor Ago has characterized this theory as follows:
Accordingly, general international law would not regard the wrongful act as
creating any obligatory relationship between the offending State and the injured
23

A

173 (London, Stevens and
THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1938),
SCHWARTZENBERGER,

GEORG,

MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sons, Library of World Affairs, 5th ed. 1967. See also,

FREEMAN,

ALWYN,

especially at 22 where he wrote (footnotes omitted):
Conventional doctrine posits a minimum number of elements as essential to the establishment
of responsibility. These may be summed up as follows: (1)an act or omission in violation of international law, (or, put somewhat differently, conduct on the part of a State contrary to that
required of it by a given international obligation); (2)The unlawful act, as a general rule, must
be imputable to the legal person of the State; that is to say, the conduct in question must be attributed to those organs or agents of the States which are qualified by municipal law to ac-

complish "State acts"; (3) resultant damage to the claimant State, either directly, in the person
of its nationals, or both.
24GRoTIus, HUGO, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, lib.lI, cap.XVII, vol.2, p.430 (transl. Kelsey, Fran-

cis W., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925)
(hereinafter cited as GROTIUS).

"5KELSEN, HANS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-19 (2nd ed. rev'd by Tucker, Robert
W.,
2 New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1966).

1bid.
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State, but would authorize the latter to react to the wrongful act of the former by applying to it a sanction in the proper sense of the term.2"
The third theory, which is now reflected in the International Law Commission's second series of Reports (Ago's) on the subject, argues that in any
system of law a wrongful act gives rise to a dual form of relationship, each
form being characterized by the different legal situations-namely (1) the right
of an injured State to claim reparation, and (2) the right of that State, and
possibly of third States, to impose a sanction (i.e., over and above claiming
reparation, the right to impose a penalty). But, under this third viewpoint, the
two legal relationships-indicated respectively by "reparation" and "sanction"-are different. In the language of continental jurisprudence the
wrongful act gives rise to a "subjective right" to reparation and an "objective
right" to have a sanction imposed on the wrongdoer. The concept of responsibility is ascribable to a subject of international law when confronted either by
the duty to make reparation or by the exposure of having a sanction imposed
upon it. While the international community lacks the institutional structure
for working out a thorough-going distinction between civil injuries and penal
offences comparable with those to be found in municipal legal systems, the
supporters of this theory see them as logically distinct and "clearly identifiable
in specific cases."'" Again, there is a growing tendency, on the part of at least
some international lawyers, to identify, within the general category of internationally wrongful acts, those offences which are so grave and injurious, not
only to the victim State, but also the world community, that the offending
State should be held responsible to all States. In support of this thesis Professor Ago cites the International Court of Justice's decision in the Barcelona
Traction case, where it states that there are certain international obligations
which are owed erga omnes, that is, to the international community as a
whole, and should be obeyed with reference to that obligation and may be enforced by the whole community or in its name and others which are owed to individual states merely.29
IV. An Overlooked Question
A central issue regarding the juxtaposition of State responsibility strictosensu with State responsibility lato sensu remains: What, under the rubric of State

2
'Ago, Roberto, Second Report on State Responsibility: The Origin of InternationalResponsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, (1970) 2 YEARBOOK O1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION p.
177 at 182, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. I, U.N. Publication Sales No: E.71 V.7
(1972).
2
Ibid., at 183.
11(1970) I.C.J. Reports 3 at 32. See also Ago, Roberto, Second Report on State Responsibility,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, (1970)2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, at 177, pp.
182-183, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. I, U.N. Publication Sales No. E.71 V.7 (1972).
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responsibility lato sensu is the proper characterization of rules of governmental liability (State responsibility strictosensu)? In terms of the notion of secondary norms of responsibility, governmental liability becomes a group of
prescriptions and standards regulating the treatment of aliens and hence, in the

language of the Continental School of State Responsibility, of primary norms.
This appraisal is confirmed by Professor Ago's remark that:
One final remark seems appropriate. Responsibility differs widely, in its aspects,
from the other subjects which the Commission has previously set out to codify. In its
previous drafts, the Commission has generally concentrated on defining the rules of
international law which, in one sector of inter-State relations or another, impose particular obligations on States, and which may, in a certain sense, be termed
"primary," as opposed to the other rules-precisely those covering the field of
responsibility-which may be termed "secondary," inasmuch as they are concerned
with determining the consequences of failure to fulfill obligations established by the
primary rules.3 0
The effect of this classification of the rules and doctrines which, taken
together, comprise the content of the Anglo-American view of State responsibility (State responsibility stricto sensu) is merely to reclassify them as ineligible for consideration under the International Law Commission's work on the
codification of State responsibility. Apart from rather dismissive comments
that they are to be seen as "primary norms," the doctrines and rules which
have been read out of State responsibility have now the appearance of unwanted orphans in the United Nations family.
V. State Responsibility and United States Practice

In the Supreme Court of the United States we may note that, although the
Continental School's theory of State Responsibility lato sensu has not been explicitly received, or even, possibly, perceived, doubts have been expressed
regarding the contemporary vitality of the traditional Anglo-American approach. Thus Mr. Justice Brennan said in the Sabbatino case:
There is, of course, authority, in international judicial and arbitral decisions, in the
expressions of national governments, and among commentators for the view that a
taking is improper under international law if it is not for a public purpose, is
discriminatory, or is without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. However, Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a degree
of compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize no obligation on the
part of the taking country. Certain representatives of the newly independent and
underdeveloped countries have questioned whether rules of state responsibility
toward aliens can bind nations that have not consented to them and it is argued that
the traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property reflect
"imperialist" interests and are inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent states.

"OAgo, Roberto, Second Report on Slate Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, (1970)
2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, at 177, 179, U.N. Doc.

A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. 1,U.N. Publication Sales No. E.71 V.7 (1972).
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The disagreement as to relevant international law standards reflects an even more
basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social ideologies of those countries that favor state
control of a considerable portion of the means of production and those that adhere
to a free enterprise system. It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and
ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations."

But this statement has not been unchallenged in the United States. For example, congressional action in enacting both of the famous Hickenlooper
Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, namely section 2370 (e)
(1) and (2),32 indicate a complex rejection of Mr. Justice Brennan's observation. It also emphasizes a revitalization of the theory of State responsibility
stricto sensu. It invokes the criterion of "contrary to international law" in its
directive to the president to cut off foreign assistance if he is not satisfied
within six months of an assured solution to a nationalization problem. The
second (the "Sabbatino Amendment") utilizes the same criterion of customary international law in its directive to the courts to "make a determination on
the merits." Subsection (e) (1) sets out the criterion as follows:
speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent
to the full value thereof, as required by international law,
And subsection (e) (2) adds to the "principles of international law" the following:
including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this
subsection. 3

In addition, from the legislative history of the Sabbatino Amendment we learn
that the Congress was not only intending to reverse the effect of the Sabbatino
"Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 at 429-30 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
Stat. 1013, U.S. Code § 2370 (e) (I) and (2).
'"For an interesting commentary on the legal issues these amendments raise see HENKIN, Louis,
"Act of State": Sabbatino in the Courts and Congress, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 107 at 112-13
(1965). Two years later Professor Henkin further commented on the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment's mandate to the courts to give "effect to the principles of international law" as
follows:
International law could become relevant to a case like Sabbatino in the courts of the United
States (as distinguished from an appropriate international tribunal) only if governing law made
it relevant. For example, international law could come in through the "side-door" of public
policy. Congress could declare that regardless of any principles of conflicts, or of the act of state
doctrine, it is the policy of the United States not to allow its courts to apply foreign law that contravenes international law. Or Congress could pass a statute providing that in Sabbatino-type
cases, courts shall not apply the substantive law designated either by act of state or by traditional conflicts principles, but shall apply instead a new federal substantive law, which incorporates by reference the principles of international law as Congress saw them. The courts in
Farr, in effect, treated the Second Hickenlooper Amendment as though it were one of these two
possible Congressional enactments. Perhaps Senator Hickenlooper would have been willing to
propose either of them; neither is what he proposed and what Congress adopted.
Henkin, Louis, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 175,
181-82 (1967) (footnotes omitted). See also HENKIN, Louis, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 223-24 (Mineola, N.Y., The Foundation Press, 1972).
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case, but also was seeking to overrule the theory of the case insofar as foreign
expropriations are concerned. 3"
In formulating the terms of the Sabbatino Amendment the Congress was,
quite clearly, calling upon American courts only to recognize titles to property
brought within the jurisdiction which, if derived from foreign nationalizations, stemmed from conduct which complied with the Anglo-American
3
theory of State responsibility, that is to State responsibility stricto sensu.
This statutory adherence to a concept of State responsibility has found an
echo in more recent legislation, namely in section 1605 (a) (3) of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 197636 which provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of Courts of the
United States or of the States in any case(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign states or that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States....

"Because the Sabbatino Amendment does not exhaust all the possibilities of the Act of State
doctrine in the American courts which culminated in the Sabbatino case, there are still areas of international and transnational interaction which are granted immunity in the American courts on
the basis that the governmental liability involved is a matter for diplomatic settlement rather than
domestic adjudication. Thus, for example, in the widely discussed case of Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331, F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'dper curiam, 461 F.2d.
1262 (9th ar.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), the courts refused to permit the judicial examination of the background to an international boundary dispute of considerable complexity which, so
the plaintiff alleged, had been engineered by the defendant with the purpose of depriving it (the
plaintiff) of its oil concession. Again, in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) the plaintiff brought antitrust suits against other Libyan and Persian Gulf oil producers. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the view that the Act of State Doctrine precludes a
private antitrust suit that would call for a judicial examination of the policies, motives and conduct of a foreign sovereign State, 550 F.2d. 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
"it is a possible response to Professor Henkin's thesis, supra note 33, to argue that the Congress
has mandated upon American courts the obligation of adhering to the stricto sensu theory of State
responsibility and to deny recognition to foreign acts of state and other foreign decisions which
depart therefrom.
90 Stat. 2891, Pub. L. 94-583, 28 U.S. Code § 1330etseq. The criterion provided by the phrase
"in violation of international law" in this legislation is the same as that of the Hickenlooper
Amendments is underscored by the House and Senate Committee Reports where, in both, the
following definition appears:
The term "taken in violation of international law" would include the nationalization or expropriation of property without payment of the prompt, adequate and effective compensation
required by international law. It would also include takings which are arbitrary or
discriminatory in nature.
See, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Bill to Define Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., at 19 (Report No. 94-1310); and House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Bill to Define Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits
Against Foreign States, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., at 19-20 (Report No. 94-1487, 1976).
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VI. State Responsibility and the General Assembly of
the United Nations
The movement away, in the International Law Commission-a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly-from Dr. Garcia Amador's position as the
first Rapporteur on the subject (his reports reflected his acceptance of responsibility stricto sensu) was diplomatically and felicitously expressed by Professor Ago in his First Report on State Responsibility37 in the following terms:
In the past, the treatment of aliens had been central to the theory of State responsibility, but in modern law responsibility was incurred less by the treatment of aliens
than by acts likely to endanger international peace. In traditional law on responsibility, such matters as denial of justice or the law of exhaustion of local remedies were
predominant. Those were still cogent issues, but their importance in international law
had diminished. The Commission would, of course, make a useful contribution in
studying them, but it could not, and should not, confine itself to such a study.
Some members also urged that in delimiting the subject care must be taken to avoid
being influenced by a situation which was purely the result of historical circumstances. Though responsibility theory had no doubt been based on a body of
judicial precedents concerned specifically with violation of the rights of aliens, a
distinction must now be made between two subjects: State responsibility in general
and the treatment of aliens. The Commission should begin by studying the general
principles governing State responsibility, wherever it was incurred, and then perhaps
go on to study its application in specific fields, especially that of injury to aliens.38
Stronger criticisms were to be found in the United Nations General
Assembly, in its Sixth Committee and in the International Law Commission.
For example Dr. Yasseen put his finger on the resistance of the Group of
Seventy-Seven to the International Law Commission drafts prior to 1963, in
the International Law Commission's Sub-Committee on State Responsibility.
He was quoted in the Summary Record of the Third Meeting of that Subcommittee as having said in effect that:
It was not advisable to begin work by a consideration of the implementation of the
principles governing international responsibility in a specific field of international
relations, for example, that of claims for injuries to the person or, more particularly,
the property of aliens. The ending of the era of colonialism left many privileged situations which needed revision in a number of the newly independent States.
The changed circumstances called for flexible solutions, and the whole subject of
responsibility in relation to those matters did not lend itself readily to codification.
He referred to the discussions which had taken place in the Second Committee of
the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the subject of permanent
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. The many amendments which had
been submitted to the draft resolution prepared by the Commission appointed to
study that subject showed that views differed widely on questions which might at first
sight have appeared uncontroversial.3 9
"U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 and Add. I (mimeo, 7 May 1969 and 20 January 1970), [1969] 2
125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969/
Add. I (New York, 1970).
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,

"Ibid., at 137.
"Meeting of 8 January 1963, 2 YEARBOOK

OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

at 230, U.N.
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Thus, it would appear that reception of the State responsibility lato sensu
approach is increasing in scope and acceptability. Its enhancement has,
reciprocally, been accompanied by the relegation of State responsibility Stricto
sensu to the status of primary norms merely in terms of the phrase "governmental liability." Such a development has, inevitably, led to the exclusion of
State responsibility stricto sensu from consideration, as such, under the rubric
of State responsibility except when breaches of primary obligation in this field
have given rise to arbitrations or judicial settlement calling for the payment of
reparations or the legitimate application of sanctions in the broadest sense.
But, if the "primary norms" of governmental liability have been ruled out of
the rubric of State responsibility as merely constituting "the implementation
of the principles governing international responsibility in a specific field of international relations,"4 0 then the Resolutions on "Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources,"" together with the "Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States,""' and the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New
'
would appear to offer the appropriate rubrics for discussEconomic Order" 43
ing, or evolving, rules for the protection of the property of aliens, replacing
those which the traditional tenets of public international law brought within
the categories of State responsibility. Again, issues involving the protection of
the person might possibly, give rise to human rights questions (also primary
norms) or simply fall within whatever primary norm of governmental liability
may be relevant in a given case.
VII. State Responsibility and Peremptory Norms
In the Barcelona Traction4 4 case the International Court of Justice
distinguished between obligations owed to individual States and those owed
erga omnes, that is, to the international community as a whole. It said:
Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1963/ADD. 1, Sales No. 63.V.2. (footnotes omitted).
"See supra, text accompanying last footnote.
"Resolution 1803 (XVII), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 17th Session,
Supp. No. 17 at 15 U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963); Resolution 2158 (XXI), United Nations General
Assembly Official Records, 21st Session, Supp. No. 6 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Resolution
2386 (XXIII), United Nations General Assembly Records, 23rd Session, Supplement No. 18 at 24,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969); Resolution No. 2692 (XXV), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session, Supp. No. 28 at 63, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Resolution No. 3016
(XXVII), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 27th Session, Supplement No. 30,
at 48, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973); Resolution No. 3171 (XXVIII), United Nations General
Assembly Official Records, 28th Session, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
"Resolution 3281 (XXIX). Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Twentyninth Session, United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Supp. No. 31 at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975).
'U.N. Doc. A/9556. Resolution 3201 (S-VI), Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly
During Its Sixth Special Session, United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special
Session, Supp. No. I at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
4[1970] I.C.J. Reports at 3.
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When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals,
whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the
law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These
obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential
distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have
entered into the body of general international law (Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I. C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of a universal
or quasi-universal character.
Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are
not of the same category. It cannot be held, when one such obligation in particular is
in question, in a specific case, that all States have a legal interest in its observance."5

Professor Ago, in his 1976 commentary on State responsibility, '

6

equated

the category of obligations owed to the international community as a whole
with the concept, more frequently met in treaty law than in the law of wrongs,
of peremptory norms (jus cogens).' This development may well have a bright

future in the area of governmental liability and exculpations'5 thereforespecially the latter. Indeed, an additional exculpation was asserted (albeit unsuccessfully) in the Arbitration Between the Libyan Arab Republic and the
California Asiatic Oil Company and the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company.'9 The Libyan Arab Republic argued that the United Nations General
Assembly's Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

constitute peremptory norms (norms jure cogentis), that is they provide "a
supreme principle justifying nationalization in every case."" 0 Libya was also
quoted as saying, in its Memorandum of 26 July 1974:
Nationalization is an act related to the sovereignty of the State. This fact has been
recognized by the consecutive Resolutions of the United Nations on the sovereignty
of States over their natural resources, the last being Resolution No. 3171 of the
United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 13, 1973, as well as

"Ibid. at 32.
"Resolution 3201 (S-VI), United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 6th Special Session, Supplement No. 1,at 3 U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
"(1970) I.C.J., Reports 3. See also, supra, note 45 and the accompanying text.
4'For an outline of the relevant exculpations treated by Professor Ago see,
supra note 13, and
the accompanying text.
"See, A ward on the Merits, (mimeo, 19 January 1977); See also Lalive, Jean-Flavien, Un grand
arbitrage ptrolier entre un Gouvernement et deux socijtts privies etrangeres, JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, Vol. 104, at 319, Appendix at 350-389 (1977).
"A ward on the Merits, 104 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL at 373.
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paragraph (4/F) of Resolution No. 3201 (S. VI) adopted on 1 May, 1974. The said
Resolutions confirm that every State maintains complete right to exercise full
sovereignty over its natural resources and recognize Nationalization as being a
legitimate and internationally recognized method to ensure the sovereignty of the
State upon such resources. Nationalization, being related to the sovereignty of the
State, is not subject to foreign jurisdiction. Provisions of the International Law do
not permit a dispute with a State to be referred to any Jurisdiction other than its national Jurisdiction. In affirmance of this principle, Resolutions of the General
Assembly provide that any dispute related to Nationalization or its consequences
should be settled in accordance with provisions of domestic law of the State. 5 '
This is not to suggest, however, that the Libyan argument contains a poten-

tial for saying that the espousal of claims on behalf of persons or enterprises
whose properties have been expropriated could come to be viewed as an international crime.52 Rather, it seeks to tell us that the sovereign power of nationalizing property cannot be contracted away, and that clauses providing for

arbitration and compensation may be subsequently rescinded unilaterally by
the nationalizing State without recourse to an international forum or reference

to international law. The Arbitrator's appraisal of the legal impact of the
Resolutions invoked by Libya provides a perceptive and succinct analysis. He
said:
As this Tribunal has already indicated, the legal value of the resolutions which are
relevant to the present case can be determined on the basis of circumstances under
which they were adopted and by analysis of the principles which they state:
With respect to the first point, the absence of any binding force of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations implies that such resolutions
must be accepted by the members of the United Nations in order to be legally
binding. In this respect, the Tribunal notes that only Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
December 1962 was supported by a majority of Member States representing all of
the various groups. By contrast, the other Resolutions mentioned above, and in
particular those referred to in the Libyan Memorandum, were supported by a majority of States but not by any of the developed countries with market economies
which carry on the largest part of international trade.
With respect to the second point, to wit, the appraisal of the legal value on the
basis of the principles stated, it appears essential to this Tribunal to distinguish
between those provisions stating the existence of a right on which the generality of
the States has expressed agreement and those provisions introducing new principles which were rejected by certain representative groups of States and having
nothing more than a de legeferenda value only in the eyes of the States which have
adopted them; as far as the others are concerned, the rejection of these same principles implies that they consider them as being contra legem.II
And Professor Virally has reinforced this appraisal of the Charter of the
Economic Rights and Duties of States in the following observation:

'A ward on the Merits at 101-102; 104 JOURNAL DU DRoIr INTERNATIONAL 374-75.
"See, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session
(3 May - 23 July 1976), United Nations GeneralAssembly Official Records, Thirty-first Session,
Supp. No. 10 at 288-90, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976).

"A ward on the Merits at 111-112; 104
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It is therefore clear that the Charter is not a first step to codification and progressive development of international law, within the meaning of Article 13, para.
l(a) of the Charter of the United Nations, that is to say an instrument purporting to
formulate in writing the rules of customary law and intended to better adjust its content to the requirements of international relations. The persisting difference of opinions in respect to some of its articles prevented reaching this goal and it is healthy
that people have become aware of this.'
VIII. Conclusion
The preceding analysis demonstrates that between many capital exporting
and capital importing States there has been a failure to communicate in the
ongoing debate about the expropriation of foreign-owned property by a
sovereign State. Although this may have been due to different concepts of the
connotation of the word "responsibility," it does not signify that when clear
meanings are stipulated and adhered to the debate itself will disappear.
Behind, and more important than, the semantic problem is the economic and
political confrontation which will not be banished by verbal clarifications. On
the other hand, clarification of the issues should lead to a more rational
discourse than would be possible while the parties continued to misunderstand
each other's meanings and language.
Secondly, while the effect of the International Law Commission's adoption
of the "continental" theory of State responsibility (State responsibility lato
sensu) does not require the abrogation of the traditional rules and doctrines
which constitute State responsibility stricto sensu, their reclassification, in
terms of civilian positivist theory, as primary norms, effectively reads them
out of the International Law Commission's current work on State responsibility. These concepts are already under fire in the developing world, as the
quotation from Mr. Justice Brennan's Opinion for the Court in the Sabbatino
case bears witness. Furthermore, if the rules and doctrines classified as State
responsibility under one theory of the term are excluded by another, to the extent that other theory becomes dominant, those rules and doctrines would tend
to become vulnerable to those who oppose them. Hence their proponents
would do well to find recognition and effectiveness for them either by means
of achieving a reversal of their dismissal from the rubric of State responsibility or, alternatively, of finding a new rubric for their exposition and affirmation. But the category which might otherwise be available for them is tending
to be viewed as the appropriate province, as to the property of aliens, of the
General Assembly's series of Resolutions on National Sovereignty over
Natural Resources and on the Declaration on the New International Economic

"4Virally, Michel, La Charte des Droits et Devoirs Economiques des Etats, 'Notes de Lecture,"
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, vol. 20, p. 57 at p. 59 (1974).
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Order; and, as to persons, that of the emerging and struggling norms,
agreements, covenants and declarations on human rights.
Thirdly, within the United States some of the debates about the Sabbatino
case and the Hickenlooper Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act could
carry more persuasiveness if it were recognized that there are strong differences of opinion about the meaning and content of the relevant doctrines of
international law. The United States Congress, it is clear, has made a choice. It
has legislated an evaluation of those concepts which prescribes American
adherence to the thesis that prompt, adequate and effective compensation is
due to an expropriated proprietor and that expropriations are not valid if
made on a discriminatory basis. It has legislated in favour of State responsibility stricto sensu and given a content to that concept which, in the world
arena, is very much a matter of debate.
Fourthly, the Act of State Doctrine, a doctrine of American (and English")
domestic law, was available, prior to the passage of the Hickenlooper Amendments, to shield domestic law courts from confrontation with the choice of
the applicable theory of governmental liability and of State responsibility. Indeed, owing to the courts' practice of accepting the Department of State's
"suggestions'" 6 that the Act of State Doctrine should be applied, when these
were given (which was not done in every case), potential issues of either
ideologial or policy choice were masked from juridical scrutiny. Only in cases
where no such suggestion was received were the courts faced with the task of
choosing." Here, too, although they tended, conscientiously, to carry out
their duty of making an independent decision, they sometimes sought to draw

"For some English cases on this point see, e.g., Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, (1929) I.K.B. 718
(C.A.); The Jupiter (No. 3), (1927) at 122, aff'd (1927) p. 250 (C.A.); Luther v. Sagor, (1921) 3
K.B. 532 (C.A.); Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank, H. and M. 505; and in the Sabbatino case Justice
Harlan saw the doctrine as taking root in England as early as 1674, Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans 604,
36 Eng. Rep. 902, 376 U.S. 398 at 416. Blad v. Bamfield, supra, was decided in Chancery. See also
Blad's Case, 3 Swans 603, 36 Eng. Rep. 991 (P.C. 1673). The premises of the doctrine are reflected
in Lord Campbell's observation, in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 2 H.L.C.I, at 27, 9
Eng. Rep. 993, at 1002 (1848), that the Lord Chancellor "would not grant an injunction against
the French Republic marching an army across the Rhine or the Alps." Contrast, however, Banco
de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Bourbon y Austria, (1935) I.K.B. 140; Frankfurter v. Exner, (1947)
1 Ch. 629; Novello v. Hinrichsen, (1951) 1 Ch. 1026 (C.A.); and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate
(The Rose Mary), (1953) 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Aden Sup. Ct.). The latter line of cases may be traced
to an even earlier example, namely Don Alonzo v. Carnero, Hobart 212, 80 Eng. Rep. 359 (Adm.
1611), also reported as Sir John Watt's Case, 2 Browne and Golds., 29, 123 Eng. Rep. 797 (Adm.
1611).
"Thus in Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), the Supreme Court categorically enunciated the
rule that the Department of State's certification "must be accepted by the courts of a conclusive
determination," ibid. at 589.
"See, e.g., Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimentos y Transportes, 336
F. 2d. 354 (2d. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), cf Bernstein v. van Heyghen
Fr~res,163 F. 2d. 246 (2d. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
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guidance (and comfort) from the Department's withholding its suggestion."
Be that as it may, a further effect of the Hickenlooper Amendments has been
to impose a clear duty of refusing recognition to proscribed conduct by foreign
states in light of a chosen theory of State responsibility (without the guidance
or direction of the Department of State) in the majority of cases.
Fifthly, if the United States were to accept the theory of State responsibility
lato sensu, it might then propose that studies be made to rehabilitate, as
primary norms, the rules and doctrines generally comprised in State responsibility stricto sensu.

"See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36, 38 (1945). For a discussion of the
points offered in the text accompanying this and the two preceding footnotes see HENKIN, Louis,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

57-64 (Mineola, N.Y., The Foundation Press, 1972).
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